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A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION. By
Charles A. Lofgren. New York: Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp.
ix, 269. Cloth, $29.95.

THE PLESSY CASE:

To the beginning student of constitutional law, Plessy v. Ferguson
juts out on the historical landscape as a significant, i( ignominious,
landmark. Torn from its late nineteenth~century context and jettisoned ahead into the twentieth-century casebook, the reasoning of its
majority opinion inspires disbelief. Justice Henry Billings Brown, who
wrote the opinion, surely must have been· lying, blind, or deranged
when he stated glibly that "the enforced separation of the two races [in
no way] stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority" 1 - or so
it seems today. The passionate indignation of Justice John Marshall
Harlan's now-famous dissent, in which he correctly prophesized that
"the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as
pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott
case, " 2 seems to underscore the coptroversial nature of the majority's
assertions, and adds an element of drama appropriate for an historical
watershed.
This dramatic view is one of the historical misconceptions that
Professor Charles Lofgren3 seeks to dispel in The Plessy Case. What is
most remarkable about Plessy, Lofgren argues, is how unremarkable it
was considered to be in its time. Both the case's result and its reasoning met with little controversy, and were hardly considered important
by the legal community or newsworthy by the popular press. 4 The
case was scarcely noted, Lofgren argues, because it fit so neatly with
the firmly established assumptions of the day concerning the meaning
of constitutional "equality" and with developing scientific theories
that sought to validate widespread racist beliefs.
The Plessy Case provides what is surely the most complete narrative account to date of the litigation that began in 1892 with the
1. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
2. 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J.; dissenting).
3. Roy P. Crocker Professor of American Politics and History at Claremont McKenna College. Professor Lofgren is also a member of the Graduate Faculty in History at the Claremont
Colleges, and is the author of "GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE": CONSTITUTIONAL EssAYS ON WAR, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND FEDERALISM (1986).
4. Pp. 5, 196-98; see also Riegel, The Persistent Career of Jim Crow: Lower Federal Courts
and the ''Separate but Equal" Doctrine, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 17, 17 (1984); Woodward, The
Case of the Louisiana Traveler, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION 157,
169, 172-73 (J. Garraty rev. ed. 1987). Professor Otto Olsen, however, arrived at a somewhat
different conclusion from that reached by either Lofgren or these surveys of the press coverage of
Plessy. See THE THIN DISGUISE: PLESSY v. FERGUSON 25 (0. Olsen ed. 1967) ("[A] random
survey of the northern white press reveals that the Plessy decision almost invariably attracted
some attention, that it aroused significant opposition, and that it seldom won strong support.").
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orchestrated arrest of Homer Plessy for riding in a "whites-only" railroad car and ended four years later with the disastrous opinion affirming the policy of "separate but equal." Yet Lofgren's account does
more than recount the litigants' story. With this book, Lofgren enters
a widening debate among historians over the origins of racial segregation following the Civil War and the significance of the Plessy decision
in promoting segregationist efforts. In The Plessy Case, Lofgren has
placed himself squarely among a growing number of historians who
are challenging the dominant view of the Jim Crow era by emphasizing the early presence of de facto segregation in the post-war South
and deemphasizing Plessy's importance in propelling a new wave of de
jure segregation in the Progressive era.
The orthodox historical account at which Lofgren takes aim has
generally been attributed to the preeminent historian of the American
South, C. Vann Woodward, who sketched his theory of the origins of
twentieth-century segregation in his 1955 book, The Strange Career of
Jim Crow. 5 What has become known simply as "the Woodward Thesis"6 traces the racism and segregation prevalent in the twentieth century primarily to laws mandating segregation passed in the late 1880s
and 1890s. By this view, the Plessy Court's affirmation of one of these
laws - an 1890 Louisiana statute requiring "equal, but separate" railway cars - was a catalyst for a second wave of segregationist legislation at the turn of the century that significantly limited the rights of
blacks. 7 Plessy "laid down the 'separate but equal' rule for the justifi5. Woodward's thesis has become the object ofrespectful attack by those who emphasize the
significance of de facto segregation rather than legislated separation. E.g., H. RABINOWITZ,
RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH: 1865-1890, at 331-33 (1978); Hovenkamp, Social
Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 625-26; see also Riegel, supra note 4,
at 19 n.10 (summarizing the debate among historians over Woodward's thesis).
In later editions of his book, Woodward qualified somewhat his emphasis upon dejure segregation, conceding the prior existence of de facto segregation while still insisting that "law has a
special importance in the history of segregation, more importance than some sociologists would
allow." c. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW ix (2d rev. ed. 1966). Yet the
debate continued to build over the next 20 years and by 1988 had spilled onto the pages of the
Journal ofAmerican History. See Rabinowitz, More Than the Woodward Thesis: Assessing The
Strange Career of Jim Crow, 75 J. AM. HIST. 842 (1988) and Woodward, Strange Career Critics:
Long May They Persevere, 15 J. AM. HIST. 857 (1988). Twenty-three years after its original
publication, Woodward was prepared to give some ground, but not much:
I ... agree with Rabinowitz that the debate has been 'fruitful' and hope to gain his
admission that it has appreciably narrowed differences by concessions on both sides. At
least I have come to agree that more segregation, both de facto and de jure, existed earlier in
the nineteenth century than I had originally allowed. And, on the other hand, I fondly
believe that most of my critics now concede that toward the end of the century an escalation
in white fanaticism resulted in a rigidity and universality of the enforcement of discriminatory law that was a sufficient change to mark a new era in race relations.
Woodward, supra, at 862.
6. See H. RABINOWITZ, supra note 5, at 331; Rabinowitz, supra note 5, at 842.
7. C. WOODWARD, supra note 5; see also Woodward, supra note 4, at 173 (asserting that
Plessy resulted in a "flood" of new "racial aggressions"). But see pp. 203-04 (describing and
refuting this assertion).

May 1989]

Legal History

1559

cation of segregation," 8 thereby slamming the door on the integrationist hopes and experiments of the Reconstruction era and signaling the
start of a new era of aggressive de jure racism that lasted throughout
the Progressive era. Based upon this view, the Plessy decision is often
seen as an aggressive lunge against racial equality, in which the Court
had to undergo contortions to launch the Jim Crow era. "To reach
[its] conclusion," notes Richard Kluger, "the Court had to indulge in
a willful reading of human nature and to abuse case law, common law,
and common sense. "9
Lofgren, however, offers a distinctly different view. Plessy's reasoning, Lofgren asserts, required no invention at all; nor did the case
have much influence over the subsequent development of de jure segregation.10 "Specifically," he writes, "[Justice] Brown's conclusions did
not rest on bad logic, bad social science, bad history, or bad constitutional law, as later alleged" (p. 197). In hindsight, of course, Brown's
social science was most certainly bad, his history reprehensible regardless of its accuracy, and his view of the Constitution decidedly sterile.
Yet, in his day, Brown's law merely captured "conventional wisdom"
(p. 197). Lofgren's view is based upon more fundamental criticisms of
the Woodward orthodoxy. He questions, for example, the degree to
which Reconstruction politics were really aimed at integration (pp. 1820), and stresses that widespread de facto segregation existed well
before the post-Plessy legislative efforts of the 1890s (pp. 15-17, 11647). Plessy, Lofgren concludes, was not a turning point in constitutional or political history and did little to change the course of the
building racist momentum.
Lofgren's view casts the emergence of laws and private company
policies requiring "separate but equal" accommodations in the late
nineteenth century in a somewhat different light: because the new
mandate in many cases compared favorably to the complete denial of
accommodations to blacks, which many at the time supported, Lofgren argues that the sort of "separate but equal" laws upheld in Plessy
can be seen as a modest step forward for civil rights. I I While it is easy
to overstate this point, because separate accommodations in the period
were, in fact, rarely equal, Lofgren argues that the principle itself was
not entirely reactionary.
Lofgren further seeks to show that the majority opinion in Plessy,
so appalling to the modem mind, should not be seen as one in which
fierce racism overcame constitutional mandates of equality in order to
8. C. WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 71.
9. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 81 (1975).
10. Pp. 203-04 (Lofgren concludes that "the evidence calls for a 'not proved' verdict on a
close relationship between the Supreme Court's 1896 handiwork and the passage of new [Jim

Crow] legislation.'').
11. Pp. 13-16, 27; see also H. RABINOWITZ, supra note 5, at 182-97; Hovenkamp, supra note
5, at 638; Rabinowitz, supra note 5, at 845-46; Riegel, supra note 4, at 25-37.
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uphold segregation. 12 Rather, Lofgren argues, it should be seen as one
in which well-meaning judges, 13 influenced by the dominant science of
the day, 14 arrived at a result perfectly compatible with accepted contemporary judicial concepts of "equality" (pp. 197-98). From this perspective, Justice Brown's opinion begins to resemble, ironically, Chief
Justice Warren's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 1s the case
that drastically undercut (but refused to overrule explicitly) Plessy
fifty-eight years later: both Justices relied upon the dominant social
science data to decide what sort of "equality" the Constitution requires.16 Once Plessy is viewed as the natural expression of its era,
Lofgren asserts, its result can properly be seen not so much as dramatically striking a blow for segregation as declining Homer Plessy's invitation to strike a dramatic blow for integration. 17
Lofgren's book is not intended as an apology for the Plessy Court's
reasoning or result. 18 Rather, by putting the case in sharper historical
12. As Richard Kluger, for example, has portrayed it. See R. KLUGER, supra note 9, at 73·
81.
13. Lofgren portrays Justice Henry Billings Brown, the author of the Court's majority opinion, as "[n]ot an inordinately ambitious man" whose "largely unexceptional" interpretations of
the Constitution merely "reflected dominant trends of the times." Pp. 197-99. Another historian
has described Brown as "one of the Court's dimmer lights,'' yet nonetheless "a steady, useful
member, relatively free of ideological ballast." R. KLUGER, supra note 9, at 73-74; see also THE
THIN DISGUISE, supra note 4, at 17-18.
14. It is worth noting in this regard that overt racism pervaded the North as well as the
South, both before and after the Civil War. Free blacks in the antebellum North were systemati·
cally discriminated against in virtually every aspect of public and private life. "Most
Northerners, to the extent they thought about it at all, rebelled at the idea of racial amalgamation
or integration. Instead, they favored voluntarY colonization, forced expulsion, or legal and social
proscription." L. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY 64 (1961). Many northerners after the War
accepted emancipation without enthusiasm, and entrenched racism, northern as well as southern,
caused Reconstruction experiments to unravel "[f]rom the start." W. GILLEITE, RETREAT
FROM RECONSTRUCTION, 1869-1879, at 366 (1979). This background of ingrained northern ra·
cism removes some of the irony in the observation that it was Justice Brown, of Massachusetts,
who wrote for the Court in P/essy, leaving it to Harlan, a former Kentucky slaveholder, to write
the lone dissent, an irony Professor Woodward has called "[t]he most fascinating paradox in
American jurisprudence." Woodward, supra note 4, at 171.
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. The similarity between Brown and Plessy was not, of course, merely coincidental. Chief
Justice Warren invoked social science data in part to rebut the reasoning upon which Plessy was
based. P. 205; 347 U.S. at 494 ("Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge
at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [that separate schools foster feelings of inferiority
among black schoolchildren] is amply supported by modem authority.") (footnote omitted); R.
KLUGER, supra note 9, at 705-06.
17. The lawyers arguing to strike down Louisiana's separate car law recognized the barriers
they faced in established legal precedent and doctrine, and therefore adopted a strategy of urging
the Court to look beyond mere case law in an appeal to broader notions of equal justice - what
Lofgren labels a "call to statesmanship" that the Court declined. Pp. 168-69.
18. Lofgren notes at the outset:
It should need no belaboring: Harlan's indignation was the morally correct response in a
republic founded on the truth "that all men are created equal." To say that is to affirm that
by taking Plessy seriously, I hardly intend to resurrect it for the benefit of the late twentieth
century, although now and again people are charged with the attempt.

P. 4.
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perspective, he hopes to correct what he sees as misperceptions in constitutional history. "[S]imply condemning the decision," he notes,
"promotes an understanding neither of it nor of America in the late
nineteenth century" (p. 4). Lofgren's book makes a valuable contribution to the developing debate over the origins of segregation and the
impact of the Plessy case by adding important qualifications to some of
the previous criticisms of Woodward's thesis. For example, Lofgren
demonstrates convincingly that the emergence of "separate but equal"
policies and laws in the late nineteenth century was not exclusively an
effort to defeat integration, nor was it, as some critics have seemed to
suggest, wholly a transitional step forward for blacks away from exclusion and toward eventual integration. 19 Instead, the truth falls somewhere in between. In particular, Lofgren argues that what has been
widely labeled as "the first 'Jim Crow' law" - an 1881 Tennessee
statute regulating conditions on railroad cars - was in fact a Republican reform measure aimed at outlawing free-wheeling discrimination
by the state's rail carriers (p. 21). Lofgren argues that the law was
motivated chiefly by a desire to curb the common practice of assigning .
all black passengers, including those who had paid first-class fare, to
inferior "smoking cars." Lofgren finds it significant that the Tennessee law did not mandate segregation across the board, but simply required railroads to make available to black passengers purchasing firstclass tickets separate accommodations equal to those offered white
first-class passengers. Yet Lofgren also points out that many of the
"separate but equal" laws that followed were clearly motivated by
white hostility and were qualified by the requirement for "equal" accommodations only because that was thought necessary to avoid judicial invalidation (pp. 24-27).
This account is also useful because it ties together several of the
separate and more focused documentary approaches found in earlier
examinations of the late nineteenth century to explain Plessy. Lofgren
begins by detailing three historical "environments" that he claims
made the result in the case all but inevitable. He first documents the
"constitutional environment" (pp. 61-92), in which expansive judicial
deference was accorded to state regulations justified by the "police
power" (pp. 83-88). Lofgren convincingly shows how the deferential
tone adopted by Justice Brown in Plessy toward Louisiana's police
power was not a strained resort to uphold the separate car statute, but
was perfectly consistent with the posture applied by the Court toward
all "due process" challenges to state laws, including by Justice Brown
himself just two years earlier in Lawton v. Steele, 20 a case having noth19. Howard Rabinowitz leaves something of this impression in his account of the development of post-Civil War segregation. See H. RABINOWITZ, supra note 5, at ch. 6; see also Riegel,
supra note 4, at 37.
20. 152 U.S. 133 (1894). In Lawton, Brown wrote for a 6-3 Court in upholding a New York
ban on fishing nets that had been justified by a state interest in preventing over-fishing.
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ing to do with race relations (pp. 87-88).
The "constitutional environment" was also one in which judges
and lawyers almost universally distinguished between two types of
"equality" in defining the requirements of the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause. By this view, blacks were entitled to "political
equality," which might include access to most public facilities and accommodations, but not "social equality," integrated access which was
seen as possible only through consent (however unlikely) and not
through the mandate of law. 21 Plessy clearly emphasized this distinction.22 In addition, the standard interpretation of the Civil War
amendments for many years before Plessy stressed the reciprocal nature of equal-protection burdens: so long as the law penalized whites
and blacks alike for crossing the color line, there was an equality of
treatment (pp. 65-66), and statutes would therefore be upheld so long
as "reasonably" related to an arguable state interest in the public welfare or morals (p. 88).
By documenting what he calls the "transportation law environment" (pp. 116-47) of the pre-Plessy era, Lofgren also shows that the
definition of "equality" adopted in Brown's opinion was hardly novel
in 1896. Lofgren argues that the "separate but equal" rule, far from
being invented by Justice Brown in Plessy, was a common law doctrine
that had applied to public carriers at least since 1867 (pp. 117-18).
This doctrine had become entrenched by the time the courts were
called upon to say what the Civil War amendments required, and provided a ready foundation for defining the duties of "equality." 23
Finally, Lofgren outlines the "intellectual environment" (pp. 93115) of the years preceding Plessy to show how the rise of popular
"scientific" theories about racial differences seemed to verify the "reasonableness" of mandated segregation. Throughout the mid-nineteenth centu_cy, many scientists purported to offer "scientific proof"
about the inferior intelligence, health, and morality of blacks. Toward
the end of the century, especially in the years immediately preceding
Plessy, the intensity of public discussion of these theories increased
rapidly as American intellectuals increasingly seized upon frequent1y
misunderstood concepts of genetics, Darwinism, and anthropology as
"evidence" bearing out their assumptions of Caucasian racial superior21. See, e.g., W. GILLETTE, supra note 14, at 367 ("Republicans readily assured whites that
the 'imaginary horrors of social equality' were merely Democratic propaganda, for ••• the [Republican] party wanted only 'equality before the law, nor more nor less.'"); Katz, The Strange
Birth and Unlikely History of Constitutional Equality, 75 J. AM. HIST. 747, 754 (1988);
Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 642-51; Riegel, supra note 4, at 32-33. According to Professor
Woodward, the distinction between "social" and "political" equality was conceded by many
blacks as well. C. WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 28 ("Negro spokesmen constantly reiterated
their disavowal of aspirations for what they called 'social equality,' and insisted that they were
concerned only for 'public equality,' by which they apparently meant civil and political rights.").
22. 163 U.S. at 544.
23. See pp. 116-47.
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ity. 24 Studies claimed to prove that blacks were more susceptible to
illness and disease, and as popular awareness increased of the danger
of contagion, it was feared that contacts with blacks promoted the
spread of disease (p. 107). Elaborate "scientific" warnings were also
offered about the danger of interracial marriage: while blacks were
demonstrably inferior to whites, it was asserted, mixed-race offspring
were inferior to both races. Blacks, the theory continued, would strive
to mix with whites until the races were dissolved into a new, even
more dangerously inferior mulatto race. 25
These scientific warnings provided seemingly objective support for
social policies aimed at separating the races and preserving racial identity. Even where prejudice was admitted as a possible motive for segregation, it, too, became enshrined in a "scientific" justification: racial
hostility was the product of deeply ingrained, natural "racial instincts"
that could not be altered by man-made law. 26 Thus, segregation was
readily justified by a "reasonable" state interest in avoiding violent
clashes by deferring to the "natural instincts" favoring separation.
Justice Brown could therefore feel as confident that social science data
supported his reasoning in Plessy as Chief Justice Warren could six
decades later in finding that social science proved separate educational
facilities to be "inherently unequal."27
Lofgren's thesis is not completely new. 28 Nor is his criticism of
"the Woodward Thesis" conclusive. What divides Woodward from
his critics, after all, is really more a disagreement over historical emphasis than historical fact. Woodward himself concedes the existence
of de facto segregation prior to the legislative onslaught of the 1890s.29
He also· acknowledges, at least in passing, the influence of scientific
24. Pp. 99-111; see also s. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981); Hovenkamp, supra
note 5. Useful collecti9ns of primary source material documenting popular "scientific" theories
of black inferiority and the existence of a natural "instinct" to racial antipathy can be found in
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEGREGATIONIST THOUGHT 29-62 (i:. Newby ed. 1968) and 1, RACIAL
THOUGHT IN AMERICA 441-97 (L. Ruchames ed. 1969).
25. Pp. 110, 115; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 656.
26. Pp. 97-99, 178-79. Plessy clearly reflected this view:
[Plessy's] argument also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and
that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by the enforced commingling of the
two races. • . • If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the
result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary
consent of individuals. . . . Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish
distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in
accentuating the difficulties in the present situation.
163 U.S. at 551.
27. 347 U.S. at 495.
28. See Hovenkamp, supra note 5; Riegel, supra note 4. In addition, elements of Lofgren's
thesis have been considered in some detail by other authors. See, e.g., S. GOULD, supra note 24
(outlining history of scientific racism); H. RABINOWITZ, supra note 5 (arguing that "separate but
equal" policies were typically adopted as an, alternative to the exclusion of blacks rather than to
integration).
29. C. WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 34, 102; Woodward, supra note 5, at 862.
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racism in validating and entrenching preexisting customs of segregation, 30 and concedes that Justice Brown did little more in Plessy than
give "voice to the dominant mood of the country" 31 at the time. But
Woodward and his critics differ over the significance attached to the
Jim Crow statutes, with Woodward arguing that they deprived blacks
of freedoms they previously enjoyed, 32 and with critics like Lofgren
arguing that they changed little in the already restricted daily lives of
American blacks. "The Woodward Thesis" will likely remain the
dominant explanation of the rise of Jim Crow in America for some
time to come, yet Lofgren surely succeeds in arguing for some adjustments. Most strikingly, The Plessy Case presents persuasive documentation of a greater degree of segregation on transportation facilities
(both southern and northern) in the pre-P/essy era than Woodward
was prepared to concede. 33 The extent of that customary segregation,
and the willingness with which lower courts generally enforced it, support Lofgren's argument that the enactment of segregationist codes
may not have greatly altered the daily habit of southern life.
Moreover, Lofgren's is the most detailed historical examination to
date of Plessy v. Ferguson, and includes a valuable narrative of the
Plessy actors and their legal strategies. Historians have written extensively about The Dred Scott Case, 34 with which Plessy has been so
often compared. 35 Yet surprisingly little has been written about
Plessy. 36 Lofgren's thoroughgoing account of the Plessy litigants, their
trial strategy, and the historical forces that shaped the Court's opinion
is, therefore, a welcome contribution. It advances our understanding
of the racism that dominated all of American society, including the
30. c. WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 103-04.
31. Woodward, supra note 4, at 173.
32. "[T]he Jim Crow statutes were effective means of tightening and freezing - in many
cases instigating- segregation and discrimination." The evidence has indicated that under
conditions prevailing in the earlier part of the period reviewed the Negro could and did do
many things in the South that in the latter part of the period, under different conditions, he
was prevented from doing.
C. WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 105 (quoting Gunnar Myrdal).
33. Compare pp. 9-17, 116-47, with C. WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 35-44.
34. See, e.g.. D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED Scarr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMER!•
CAN LAW AND PoLmcs (1978); v. HOPKINS, DRED Scorr's CASE (1951).
35. The comparisons began, of course, in the case itself, with Justice Harlan's dissent. See
supra note 2 and accompanying text.
36. One of the few other serious examinations was contained in Professor Otto Olsen's 1967
book THE THIN DISGUISE, supra note 4. Olsen's analysis there, however, is confined to an intro·
duction, with the remainder of the volume made up of edited primary source material from
briefs, newspaper editorials, and correspondence among the P/essy attorneys. Olsen's introduc·
tion makes a start toward examining the context from which Plessy arose, but, at 28 pages,
cannot begin to offer the documentary and argumentative detail that Lofgren provides.
Professor Woodward has also provided a brief historical account of the P/essy litigation in
QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CoNSTITUTION, supra note 4. But it, too, is constrained
by its essay format and does not aspire to the in-depth analysis Lofgren undertakes.
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legal community, during those years and helps to put the Plessy decision in its proper context.

- David iJ. Meyer

